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Miscalculating Welfare 
 Baby-selling.1  Racial discrimination.2  Insider trading.3  Legal economists have 
argued that each of these activities should be legalized in the service of wealth 
maximization.  Indeed, these are just a few of the legions of contrarian proposals 
advanced by legal economists as efficient.  Such proposals are at least counterintuitive, 
and perhaps even shocking.  In fact, from a careerist perspective, their startling quality 
may be their primary virtue.  But in pursuing the attention that comes with novelty, the 
authors of these works have overlooked the negative externalities that also accompany 
avant-garde positions.  Legal rules that strike most people as unjust may upset 
community expectations and undermine the efficiency of the very rules proposed.  In 
short, such rules may not prove wealth-maximizing at all.   
Counterintuitive rules are even less likely to prove welfare maximizing.  The 
proclaimed goal of economics is to find welfare-maximizing policies.  Because of the 
difficulties associated with measuring welfare, many economists – and the vast majority 
of legal economists – focus instead on wealth maximization, under the generally implicit 
assumption that social welfare rises monotonically with social wealth.  This assumption 
is badly flawed.  People often express a willingness to trade some material wealth in 
exchange for intangible values such as justice, fairness, or even predictability.  Unjust 
seeming rules, then, are even more unlikely to maximize social welfare than they are to 
enhance social wealth.  To truly enhance social welfare, economists should examine more 
closely the relationship between wealth, social values, and welfare. 
1 Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 
(1978).    
2 RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
(1992). 
3 Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983). 
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In this essay, we argue that legal economists’ failure to include people’s 
preferences for fairness undermines their policy prescriptions, even by economists’ own 
maximizing standards.  Part I discusses three prominent counterintuitive proposals from 
legal economists.  Our purpose here is not to engage the authors’ arguments in detail, but 
rather to provide a context for the rest of our discussion.  Part II first argues that the 
proper focus of law and economics is welfare and not wealth, and legal economists 
should not assume welfare is enhanced whenever wealth is maximized.  Part II then turns 
to the people’s preferences for fair rules.  Here, we discuss the empirical evidence of 
people’s preferences for fair rules, and argue that given this evidence, it is 
methodologically unacceptable for legal economists to fail to include (and to give 
sufficient weight to) these preferences within their calculations.  Part III discusses the 
likely costs of actually adopting rules that are broadly perceived as surprising and unfair.  
We point out that such rules are likely to defeat reasonable expectations, instigate 
resistance, and undermine the overall legitimacy of the legal system.  As a result, we 
believe these proposals fail even on their own wealth-maximizing terms.  Part IV 
discusses the market hidden behind this discussion – the market for this sort of creative, 
but counterintuitive, legal scholarship.  Here, we discuss the positive and negative effects 
of lending legitimacy to and rewarding these sorts of counterintuitive proposals. 
I. A Few Salient Examples
The Law and Economics literature is rife with examples of proposals that would 
strike most non-economists as unfair, immoral, or at least unexpected.  In this section, we 
highlight a few prominent examples to concretize the phenomena and ground our 
subsequent discussion.  In a way, this section was the most difficult for us to write, not 
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because we had difficulty finding suitable examples but because we found so very many.  
Nevertheless, we have managed to limit our textual discussion to three.4 
A. Baby Selling
Richard Posner is generally considered the most prominent legal economist alive 
today.  In 1978 he and coauthor Elisabeth Landes proposed that baby selling (their term 
not ours) be legalized.5  Despite the shocking terminology, the authors’ intentions were 
manifestly benign.  They argued that creating an open and legal market permitting an 
adoptive parent to pay a natural mother for the right to adopt her child would have 
numerous positive effects.  Paying mothers for their children would reduce the number of 
abortions, eliminate the shortage of babies available for adoption, and decrease the 
number of unadopted children kept in foster care.6  Their article employed sophisticated 
mathematical modeling and statistical data to bolster their argument that legalizing baby 
sales would produce these beneficent policy outcomes.   
Posner and Landes acknowledged that many people would consider a market in 
children “undesirable.”7  They cited commentators who referred to such a market as 
“dealings in human flesh” and a “taint on civilized society.”8  They also admitted that 
permitting natural parents to sell their children might “smack of slavery”9 and produce 
4 For interested readers, we note here some other promising candidates.  Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen 
Segerson, Punishing the Innocent Along with the Guilty:  The Economics of Individual versus Group 
Punishment, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 81 (2007) (group punishment); James D. Miller, Using Lotteries to Expand 
the Range of Litigation Settlements, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 69 (1997) (settling disputes by lottery); Moin A. 
Yahya, Deterring Roper's Juveniles:  Using a Law and Economics Approach to Show that the Logic of 
Roper Implies that Juveniles Require the Death Penalty More than Adults, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 53 (2006) 
(executing minors). 
5 Landes and Posner, supra note 1. 
6 Id. at 325, 327. 
7 Id. at 339. 
8 Id.  
9 Id. at 344. 
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“moral outrage.”10  But they argued that these objections were not well-founded.  Unlike 
slaves, children sold through their system would retain the protections of legal 
prohibitions on child abuse and neglect, though these protections might admittedly prove 
inadequate.11  Also, while a market system would not screen parents for suitability the 
way the current system does, they doubted the value of such screening and proposed 
requiring some “minimal background investigation” for buyers in the baby market, a sort 
of driver’s license for baby purchasers.12  Landes and Posner took comfort in their faith 
that people do not generally buy expensive items in order to damage them, analogizing 
adoption of a child to the purchase of a television set.13 
Perhaps their most telling point is their analysis of the likely costs of babies in the 
newly legalized market.  Although the black market for babies resulted in very high 
prices, they argued that in a legal market babies would be relatively affordable.14  They 
had several supportive arguments, but the most interesting for our purposes involved the 
amount necessary to compensate the natural mother for giving up her baby rather than 
aborting the pregnancy or raising the child herself.  Landes and Posner contended that the 
net cost in this category would be quite low because the costs to the natural mother would 
be substantially identical to those saved by the adoptive mother in not bearing a child 
herself.15  While this theory might have some validity when applied to medical costs,16 
we think most mothers would find quite surprising the proposition that the amount they 
10 Id. at 345. 
11 Id. at 343. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 339-41. 
15 Id. at 340. 
16 Even when applied to medical costs, we actually doubt the theory’s validity.  Presumably, mothers giving 
up their children would tend to be of much lower economic status than adopting mothers, and therefore 
much less likely to have adequate medical insurance. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1102819
would demand to give up their children consists mostly of the medical costs they incurred 
during pregnancy and birth.  The emotional toll of giving up a baby is not a cost the 
adoptive mother would face if she bore the child.  Landes and Posner’s argument to the 
contrary highlights the problem we are illustrating, that legal economists frequently 
ignore (or intentionally attempt to contradict) most people’s feelings about what the law 
should be.  This tendency may have sharply deleterious consequences, as we argue 
below. 
B. Racial Discrimination
In his landmark 1992 book, Forbidden Grounds,17 Richard Epstein relied on 
economic arguments to explain why the laws prohibiting racial discrimination in 
employment should be repealed.18  Epstein’s arguments are no more premised on malice 
towards racial minorities than Landes and Posner’s were based on hatred of babies.  To 
the contrary, Epstein believes that laws prohibiting racial discrimination actually harm 
racial minorities (along with everyone else) and that repealing these laws would benefit 
everyone.19 
Epstein premised his case on the notion that discrimination may sometimes 
reduce agency costs and therefore prove efficient.20  Governance costs rise as the tastes of 
the firm’s members and employees diverge.21  One way to reduce agency costs and 
promote harmony within the firm, then, is to hire employees with similar tastes.22  
Employees who share the same tastes in music, Epstein illustrated, will not quarrel over 
17 EPSTEIN, supra note 2. 
18 Epstein also argued against laws prohibiting gender, age, and disability discrimination.  Id. at 9. 
19 Id. at 57-75. 
20 Id. at 59-65 
21 Id. at 57. 
22 Id. 
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what type of music to play in a common workspace.23  Finding workers with similar 
tastes will often result in hiring a disproportionate number of some particular racial 
minority, whose members may be more likely to share some tastes than the components 
of a more diverse group.24   
Another way to reduce agency costs is to recruit through a third party referrer who 
implicitly bonds the workers’ performance.25  For an example, Epstein drew on the case 
of the Daniel Lamp Company.26  The Daniel Lamp Company established relationships 
with two Hispanic groups, the Spanish Coalition and the Latino Youth Organization, 
which each recommended unskilled workers for employment.27  The organizations then 
had a vested interest in ensuring that the workers they recommended were of high 
quality, since otherwise the company would stop trusting them for referrals and they 
would lose a valuable opportunity for their members.28  This system resulted in cheap 
bonding for the workers and an inexpensive source of reliable labor, helping to maximize 
the company’s earnings.29  The system also resulted in the company hiring mostly 
Hispanic workers and commensurate liability under the antidiscrimination laws.30   
Finally, Epstein pointed out that if bigots concentrated themselves in firms that 
discriminated against racial minorities, firms that did not discriminate would end up 
relatively bigot-free.  Without the interference of antidiscrimination laws, this would be 
likely to occur.  Bigots would likely to seek out firms that discriminated, since they 
strongly preferred to avoid contact with racial minorities.  By means of the bigots’ self-
23 Id. at 61-62. 
24 Id. at 63-64. 
25 Id. at 70-71. 
26 Id. at 70-71. 
27 Id. at 70. 
28 Id. at 70-71. 
29 Id. at 71. 
30 Id. at 70-71. 
6
selection, firms that did not discriminate would have few bigots, even if the companies 
themselves were indifferent as to whether their employees were bigots (which is 
unlikely).  Firms without bigots should be easier to manage and therefore face lower 
governance costs.31 
Epstein fully understood that his proposal was alarming.  On the very first page of 
his book he stated, “There is little question that a broad antidiscrimination principle lies 
at the core of American political and intellectual understandings of a just and proper 
society, not only in employment but also in housing and public accommodations, medical 
care, education, indeed in all areas of public and private life.”32  He reiterated this point 
several times in different ways, stating that the antidiscrimination statutes command 
“enormous support” from U.S. elites,33 quoting President George Herbert Walker Bush 
vilifying discrimination as a “‘fundamental evil that tears at the fabric of our society,’”34 
and claiming that even as strong and independent an institution as the United States 
Supreme Court could not “withstand the pounding that would result of it undertook a 
frontal assault on the basic antidiscrimination norm.”35  Nevertheless, he concluded that 
the antidiscrimination statutes should be repealed.36  Discrimination should be legal 
because it was often rational and wealth-maximizing.37 
C. Insider Trading
Our final example comes from the world of the securities markets.  For most 
people who buy or sell publicly trades securities, stock transactions are anonymous and 
31 Id. at 74-75. 
32 Id. at 1. 
33 Id. at 3. 
34 Id. at 3. 
35 Id. at 6. 
36 Id. at 9 (advocating the repeal of Title VII as it applies to private employers operating in competitive 
markets without legal protections against new entries). 
37 Id. at 68-69. 
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impersonal.  Most market participants rely on the integrity of an enormous market and 
the hard work, intelligence, and powerful incentives of literally thousands of 
sophisticated traders and analysts to produce the most accurate stock prices possible 
based on the information publicly available.  While some market participants are better at 
divining the future direction of equity prices than others – witness Warren Buffet – we 
can all at least take comfort in the thought that the playing field is level. 
Some potential buyers and sellers, however, may have a significant advantage 
unconnected to their native talents or diligence.  Officers, directors, employees and 
agents of public corporations may, in the course of their duties, learn important 
information – information that could affect market prices – that has not been released to 
the public.  For these insiders, trading in their company’s stock is like playing poker with 
a marked deck only they can read. 
Largely for this reason, insider trading has been prohibited in the United States for 
generations.  The primary justifications for the ban have always been fairness and the 
perception of fairness.  The ban’s advocates have argued that it is unfair to allow 
corporate insiders who possess material, confidential information to trade with market 
participants who lack that private information.38  They have also argued that investors 
will not participate in a market they perceive to be unfair, or rigged in favor of insiders.39  
38 See In re Cady Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961) (concern that uninformed may be exploited);  
Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle:  A Post-Chiarella Assessment, 70 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1982) (rule’s acceptance rests in intuition that insider trading is unfair); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts:  The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 
COLUM. L. REV.  1319, 1321 (1999) (rationale is that insiders should not be permitted to take advantage of 
shareholders); Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets:  Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. 
REV. 117, 124-125 (1982) (insider trading violates fairness goals). 
39 See H.R. Rep. No. 98-355, at 4 (1984) (insider trading undermines confidence in the markets); Victor 
Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 322, 356-57 (1979) (Congress’ purpose in enacting the securities laws was in part to restore public 
trust in the markets).
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The laws banning insider trading, then, are based both on a sense of fair play for its own 
sake and on a more pragmatic concern that the markets will not function if they appear to 
give some players an unfair advantage. 
Despite these concerns, renowned legal economists Dennis Carlton and Daniel 
Fischel argued in the Stanford Law Review that insider trading should be permitted.40  
Carlton and Fischel acknowledged that many consider insider trading unfair, but 
concluded that the practice was efficient nonetheless.41  They argued that insider trading 
would at least in some cases promote more accurate securities prices.42  Insider trading 
provides an alternative avenue of communication from the firm to investors.43  When the 
market detects insiders trading, it adjusts the company’s stock price accordingly, bidding 
the price up higher if insiders are buying and reducing the price if insiders are selling.44  
The end result under ideal conditions may approach the effect of actually disclosing the 
inside information.45  Companies may prefer to disclose through insider trading for a 
number of reasons, such as when disclosure would destroy the value of the information 
(such as the presence of oil under land the company is considering buying) or when the 
information is uncertain and the company wishes to avoid liability for a misdisclosure if 
the information turns out to be false.46  Accurate pricing is wealth-maximizing for a 
40 Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3.  They are certainly not alone.  See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and 
Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 718-19 (1980) (permitting insider 
trading would result in more accurate securities prices); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law 
Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 565-76 (1970) (same). 
41 Id. at 858, 880-882. 
42 Id. at 865-68. 
43 Id. at 868. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 868. 
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number of reasons, but chiefly because correct prices permit investors to reduce their 
investments in discovering improperly valued securities.47 
Carlton and Fischel also contended that insider trading would constitute a more 
efficient way to compensate and hire managers.48  Shareholders desire compensation 
schemes that will induce managers to seek out and implement high expected value 
opportunities.49  Legalizing insider trading may produce the correct incentives.50  Insider 
trading rewards managers who discover good opportunities and put them into effect by 
permitting them to trade in advance of public knowledge of the company’s imminent 
success.51  Insider trading may prove a cheaper method of incentivizing managers than 
renegotiating each time a corporate opportunity arises or structuring complicated 
incentives contracts ex ante.52  In addition, insider trading may turn out to be a valuable 
screening tool in selecting managers who will work hard and will take efficient levels of 
risks.53  Since insider trading rewards hard-working managers who create profitable 
opportunities for the corporation, only such managers should be willing to accept insider 
trading as a substantial component of their compensation.54  These are precisely the 
managers corporations generally want to hire.55 
Carlton and Fischel acknowledged that insider trading might not always be 
efficient for every corporation.56  They discussed numerous concerns that might render 
insider trading disadvantageous for some companies in some circumstances, such as the 
47 Id. at 866-67. 
48 Id. at 869-72. 
49 Id. at 869-71. 
50 Id. at 870-71. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 871-72. 
54 Id. at 871-72. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 861-66. 
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moral hazard problem and issues concerning disclosure timing.57  The inherent unfairness 
of insider trading to non-insider market participants, however, received short shrift.  In a 
few short paragraphs, the authors argued that if insider trading is efficient, and therefore 
increases the total resources to be divided, then it benefits both insiders and outsiders as a 
class.58  In other words, since insider trading makes even outsiders wealthier than they 
would be without insider trading, the practice cannot be unfair. 
These three examples – baby selling, employment discrimination, and insider 
trading – highlight the tendency of legal economists to treat fairness concerns as largely 
irrelevant to their policy recommendations.  Legal rules that produce greater wealth 
should be chosen even if – perhaps especially if – they contradict commonly-held notions 
of justice and fair play.  In Section III, we argue that this strategy is misguided under both 
wealth maximization and welfare maximization frameworks. 
II. Wealth, Welfare and Fairness
In this section, we introduce two methodological difficulties.  First, legal 
economists often focus on wealth as a proxy for maximizing welfare.  However, it is 
social welfare that economists seek to enhance, and wealth is often a poor approximation 
of welfare.  Second, legal economists discount people’s preferences for fairness, at most 
mentioning that their proposals run contrary to these tastes.  In this section, we argue that 
there is robust empirical evidence of people’s preference for fairness and that this 
preference cannot be ignored in legal economists’ welfare calculations. 
57 Id. at 872-82. 
58 Id. at 880-82. 
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A. Wealth v. Welfare
Over twenty-five years ago, in a famous pair of articles, Richard Posner argued 
that the goal of legal economists should be to divine the policies that would promote 
wealth maximization, rather than welfare maximization.59  While the extreme version of 
this view of wealth maximization as moral theory has been energetically criticized (and 
Posner himself has disavowed this view),60 economists often defend wealth maximization 
models as a useful simplification that tracks social welfare.61  More importantly, in 
practice legal economists overwhelmingly use wealth maximization models, rather than 
welfare maximization.62 
This tendency courts frequent and substantial analytical errors.  Wealth does not 
equate with welfare.  To the contrary, under many circumstances people will willingly 
trade material goods for other values, such as distributional fairness or justice.  
Experience provides numerous examples of such choices, such as blood donations, 
charitable gifts, and wealthy people supporting more sharply progressive taxes.  While 
considerable ingenuity has been devoted to developing strategic explanations for some of 
59 Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 103 (1979); Richard 
Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 487 (1980).
60 See LOUIS KAPLOW AND STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 35 n.41 (2002).
61 See, e.g., id. at 37; Richard Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law:  A Philosophical Inquiry in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 99-100 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (defending the use of
wealth maximization models in choosing legal rules).  As Ed Diener and Martin Seligman explain:
In microeconomics…, the standard assumption is that, other things being equal, more choices 
mean a higher quality of life because people with choices select courses of action that maximize 
their well-being.  Because income correlates with number of choices, greater income is equivalent 
to higher well-being.  This formulation is standard in economics, where income is seen as the 
essence of well-being, and therefore measures of income are seen as sufficient indices to capture 
well-being. 
Ed Diener & Martin E.P. Seligman, Beyond Money:  Toward an Economy of Well-Being, 5 PSYC. SCI. IN 
PUBLIC INT. 1, 2 (2004). 
62 See, e.g., KAPLOW AND SHAVELL, supra note 60, at 100-103, 124-133, 174-203, 232-241, & 254-272 
(using wealth maximization models). 
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these behaviors,63 experiments such as the ultimatum game verify the widely-held 
intuition that wealth often yields to other values.64   
Among the greatest challenges to equating wealth with welfare is the growing 
happiness research.65  In arguing that the well-being should be pursued directly, Diener 
and Seligman note the many problems with assuming that money does buy happiness, 
including that there are diminishing returns for individuals’ higher incomes and that 
increased societal wealth does not translate into increased individual happiness.66  On the 
other hand, form of government, trusting communities, and religion increase well-being, 
but cannot be measured by wealth.67  Moreover, even when income and well-being are 
related, the relationship is complicated.  Money is more likely to buy happiness in poorer 
societies.68  And, happy people tend to make more money, thus calling into question the 
causal relationship.69  The focus on money may have played a role in simplifying the 
economist’s task, but recent research reveals that economists have oversimplified it.  
Although we will doubtlessly need to continue to rely on money in some instances,70 the 
happiness literature raises a flag of caution. 
63 See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000). 
64 For example, Ruben Durante and Louis Putterman recently conducted a fascinating experiment that 
found that a large majority of subjects were willing to give up a significant portion of the game’s payoff in 
“taxes” in exchange for a more equal distribution of profits.  See Ruben Durante & Louis Putterman, 
Preferences for Redistribution and Perception of Fairness: An Experimental Study (July 27, 2007). 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1004573. 
65 Notably , there are a number of methodological difficulties with current happiness research.  See Diener 
& Seligman, supra note 61, at 3-4. 
66 Id. at 5-6. 
67 Id. at 6-7. 
68 Id. at 7-8. 
69 Id. at 8-9. 
70 As Adler and Posner see it, abandoning the assumption that money impacts well-being would have 
profound implications: 
The premise that money has no impact on well-being would not merely explode CBA[cost-benefit 
analysis], by leading to undefined [compensating variations].  It would also have radical 
implications for other practices even more central to the legal system than CBA, such as judicial 
damage awards in tort and contract cases, antitrust law, and progressive taxation.  The 
compensatory rationale for awards would evaporate. 
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B. Fairness
1. Fairness as a Preference
Within welfare economics, an actor’s concern for fairness is simply one 
preference among others.  Hence, to the extent that citizens express a preference for 
fairness, this preference – like preferences for money or happiness – must be taken into 
account.  Some welfare economists label this preference for fairness, a “taste for 
fairness.”71 
For our purposes here, we will use the term “fairness” as a rough proxy for other-
regarding preferences that deviate from the presumption that individuals prefer those 
things in their rational self-interest.  That is, individuals may have fairness preferences in 
equality and proportionality, but they may also be motivated by altruism or envy.72  
Because this essay is an internal critique of law and economics, we will take 
seriously the claim that fairness concerns are simply preferences.  But before doing so, 
we wish to note two ways in which fairness may be more than simply a preference. 
First, welfare economists must make initial determinations about how to 
aggregate preferences.  Does everyone count?  Does everyone count equally?  These 
questions cannot be answered without making value judgments.  Moreover, a selection 
among distributive approaches will have an effect on the outcome of the social welfare 
function.  For example, a decision to count everyone’s preferences equally yields a very 
different result than counting only the preferences of white males.  Crucially, the decision 
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis (forthcoming Journal 
of Legal Studies) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999928, (manuscript at 19). 
71 As described by Kaplow and Shavell, individuals may have “a taste for a notion of fairness, just as they 
may have a taste for art, nature, or fine wine.” KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 60, at 21. 
72 For an empirical attempt to distinguish among these preferences, see Jeremy Clark, Fairness in Public 
Good Provision:  An Investigation of Preferences for Equality and Proportionality, 31 CANADIAN J. ECON. 
708 (1998). 
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between these possibilities must be made by a criterion outside of the welfare counting 
mechanism itself.  Welfare economists must therefore make a critical decision – how to 
aggregate social welfare – on the basis of some value other than efficiency (such as 
“fairness”) in order to perform any economic analysis.73 
Second, many theorists believe that fairness concerns may trump otherwise 
welfare maximizing rules.  In the hypothetical case “Surgeon,”74 a surgeon seeks to cut 
up one healthy individual and distribute his organs to five sick individuals.75  Theorists 
argue that even if this rule were welfare maximizing,76 cutting up one individual would 
be impermissible because doing so would be appropriating him.77   
At this point, however, we would like to put these two (substantial) concerns to 
the side.  For the remainder of this essay, we will try to assess the strength of the “taste 
for fairness,” and argue that, even when fairness is viewed as a taste, economists are 
paying too little attention to how this taste may undermine not only the legal rule that 
they are proposing but also the legal regime as a whole.  
2. Evidence of the Preference for Fairness
A thorough empirical calculation must include all factors that could influence the 
result.  Of course, some factors may not be statistically significant, and depending upon 
one’s discipline and the need for exact calculations, some factors may be ignored.  
However, the mere lip service that is given to the taste for fairness within the legal 
73 On these points, see generally Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare Depends on Fairness: A Reply to Kaplow 
and Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847 (2002). 
74 See Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, reprinted in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION & RISK:  ESSAYS IN 
MORAL THEORY 95 (1986). 
75 For the argument that such a rule would not be Pareto superior, see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Some 
Sound and Fury from Kaplow and Shavell, 23 LAW & PHIL. 73, 82 (2004). 
76 That is, assuming that this would not lead to great social instability and so forth (the very repercussions 
we discuss below). 
77 Larry Alexander, Lesser Evils:  A Closer Look at the Paradigmatic Justification, 24 LAW & PHIL. 611, 
615-616 (2005).
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economist’s typical empirical conclusions is utterly unacceptable.  The taste for fairness 
is pervasive, and the preference for fairness is very strong. 
At the outset, we note that we do not need to rely on empirical studies to make 
this claim.  The taste for fairness is patent within our society.  Children complain if a rule 
is “unfair” but not if it is inefficient.  We teach our children what it means to deserve 
praise and blame.  And, we teach our children not to discriminate against people of 
different sexes, races, or religions; to believe that humans may not be bought or sold; and 
to value fair play. 
However, we can make our case beyond even these obvious observations.  The 
taste for fairness runs deep.  Consider first the capuchin monkey.78  Scientists conducted 
tests in which they gave capuchins food in exchange for rocks.79  Capuchins like 
cucumbers and happily exchange cucumbers for rocks.80  However, capuchins prefer 
grapes to cucumbers.81  (Who wouldn’t?)  During the test, the scientists gave some 
monkeys grapes for rocks and others cucumbers for rocks.82  The cucumber-receiving 
monkeys stopped exchanging the rocks for food or refused to eat the cucumber – “a 
directly accessible food that they readily accept and consume under almost any other set 
of circumstances.”83  From this, the researchers concluded that capuchins “measure 
reward in relative terms, comparing their own rewards with those available, and their 
own efforts with those of others.”84  Thus, to a monkey, it is not simply about how many 
rewards one may receive, but how well off one is compared to others. 
78 Sarah F. Brosnan & Frans B.M. de Waal, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, 425 NATURE 297(2003). 




83 Id. at 298. 
84 Id. at 299. 
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Even among human beings, the scientific documentation of the taste for fairness 
is robust.  Individuals have tastes for fairness that run contrary to rational actor 
assumptions.  One study asked individuals how tickets should be distributed in a case in 
which demand exceeded supply.85  The subjects’ clear order of preferences was standing 
in line, then a lottery, then an auction.86  Of course, economic predictions run in the exact 
opposite order – favoring auctions (he who values the ticket most will pay most) and 
disfavoring lines (which are wasteful). 
Perhaps the most famous endorsement of fairness is the ultimatum game.87  In the 
ultimatum game, two subjects are told that they will split a sum of money.  One subject 
proposes how the two will split the money.  The second subject then either accepts or 
rejects the offer.  If the offer is accepted, the money is split according to the offer’s terms.  
If the offer is rejected, neither subject receives anything.  Purely rational actors in the 
proposing role would offer a split in which the offeror receives nearly all the money and 
the offeree receives next to nothing.  Purely rational offerees would accept these offers 
because even very little money is better than nothing.  Each subject plays the game only 
once, so there are no incentives to cooperate stemming from a repeat play strategy.  In a 
result surprising only to economists, across many cultures offerors often propose a 
roughly even split (around 40% on average), and offerees faced with drastically unfair 
proposals frequently reject the offer.88  In other words, the ultimatum game demonstrates 
85 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 
J. BUS. S285, S287 (1986).
86 Id.
87 See Joseph Neil Bearden, Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments:  The State of the Art, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=626183 at 3-4 (November 2001); Werner Guth, et. al, An Experimental Analysis of 
Ultimatum Bargaining, 75 J. ECO. BEH. & ORGANIZATION 367 (1982).
88Bearden, supra note 87, at 5-7; Alvin E. Roth, et. al, Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, 
Ljubljana, Pittsburgh And Tokyo: An Experimental Study, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1068, 1070 (1991); Joseph 
Henrich, et al, In search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 91
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robustly that people willingly sacrifice their pecuniary self-interest to promote other 
values such as fairness. 
These are but a few of the empirical studies that clearly demonstrate that 
individuals have a strong preference for fairness.  Indeed, this preference is sometimes 
stronger than any preference individuals have to act in their rational self-interest.  
Because individuals weight fairness so heavily, any policy that seeks to enhance their 
welfare must take account of their fairness preferences. 
3. Responses to Fairness
Given the empirical evidence of the taste for fairness, one should expect that 
fairness significantly figures into social welfare calculations made by legal economists.  
This, however, is not the case.  Rather, legal economists seem to adopt one of two 
strategies.  Some have simply ignored it.  Others have attempted to explain fairness away.   
More often than not, fairness is simply ignored.  As Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler, have noted: 
The economic agent is assumed to be law-abiding but not “fair” – if fairness 
implies that some legal opportunities for gain are not exploited.  This nonfairness 
assumption expresses a resistance to explanations of economic actions in moral 
terms that has deep roots in the history of the discipline.  The central insight that 
gave rise to modern economics is that the common good is well served by the free 
actions of self-interested agents in a market.89 
AM. ECON. REV. 73 (2001); Hessel Oosterbeek, et. al, Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments:  
Evidence From a Meta-Analysis, 7 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 171 (2004) (although exact percentages vary 
quite a bit, the average of the means of the offered shares is approximately 40%). 
89 Kahneman et al., supra note 85, at  S286. 
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As Kahneman, Knetsh, and Thaler note, there are two possible reasons for this 
neglect – one substantive and one methodological.90  The substantive claim is that one 
may believe that there is no real substantive content to fairness.  If fairness concerns are 
really just charades for self-interest then there is no need to account for fairness needs 
separately.  The methodological claim is simply this – things just get too complicated 
when theorists must take into account fairness calculations.  If the benefit of economic 
modeling is answers, the more factors, the more complicated the model, the harder those 
answers are to come by. 
Taking the methodological rationale first, we simply believe that this factor 
cannot be ignored.  Legal economists are presumably making policy recommendations 
that they believe should become the law.  The calculations may be complicated.  
However, if a theorist is going to advocate for a particular position as the welfare-
maximizing one, then that policy should truly – all things considered – maximize welfare. 
As for the substantive claim, it seems to us that the burden is on legal economists 
to show – through empirical data—that the impact of fairness is not statistically 
significant or is simply self-interest in disguise.  However, given the current data that 
exists, the taste for fairness runs deep and must be accounted for, not ignored. 
Some legal economists attempt to undermine the role of fairness by explaining 
our attachment to it.  For instance, Harvard legal economists Louis Kaplow and Steven 
Shavell present a two-step argument against fairness.91  First, they link fairness theories 
to social norms. Here, they assert a causal thesis to explain why the reader is attracted to 
fairness, arguing that the attachment to fairness theories comes from their similarity to 
90 Id.  
91 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 60, at 63, 136-139, 357-59. 
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social norms that are inborn (via evolution) or inculcated. Second, Kaplow and Shavell 
argue that social norms themselves should not provide an independent basis for making 
legal policy decisions. They claim that social norms serve as rules of thumb for 
advancing social welfare and have evolved or were indoctrinated for this purpose; hence, 
because welfare economics can calculate social welfare directly, reliance on these social 
norm proxies is unnecessary.92
There are two problems with this argument.  First, a causal explanation of a belief 
does not undermine the truth of that belief.  As Jules Coleman noted, “the view that the 
existence of a causal explanation of the facts that someone holds or asserts a particular 
claim undermines the truth of the claim asserted simply cannot be sustained.”93  Indeed, 
as Coleman notes, even if evolution selected for beliefs, why would it select for false 
beliefs over true ones?94  Second, Kaplow and Shavell’s move from the observation that 
social norms enhance welfare to the claim that they were inculated for this purpose is a 
non sequitur.95  There are other alternative explanations for why fairness beliefs may 
often be welfare enhancing.  Fairness beliefs and social norms may be linked by a 
common morality, and, even if not aimed at maximizing welfare, it would be a very short-
lived morality that did not somehow enhance it.   
Ultimately, taking Kaplow and Shavell’s claim to its logical conclusion would 
lead to a complete refusal to count fairness at all.  Although Kaplow and Shavell claim to 
be willing to include fairness as a preference (when empirically demonstrated, though 
92 Id. at 68, 71. 
93 Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L. J. 1511 (2003). 
94 Id. at 1534. 
95 See generally Ferzan, supra note 75, at 93. 
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they doubt this will often be the case),96 their argument – that fairness is just a rough 
proxy for a welfare-enhancing standard – amounts to an argument that fairness is just a 
mistaken preference.  That is, people, were they to know how a legal rule would effect 
them, would no longer prefer the fair rule.  However, given that Kaplow and Shavell 
claim that mistaken preferences are not entitled to any weight,97 it seems that they cannot 
give any weight to fairness.  Because their argument dissolves fairness completely, 
Kaplow and Shavell will have to put forth a more compelling argument for why it is 
simply a mistaken preference.  To this point, they have not met their burden.98 
III. The Perils of Ignoring Fairness
In this section, we argue that, when theorists fail to take fairness into account, 
their results may be neither wealth nor welfare maximizing.  The rule itself may not 
maximize wealth or welfare because it defeats reasonable expectations or even instigates 
resistance.  Additionally, the legal rule may have significant negative externalities – it 
may undermine the legal system as a whole.  
A. Getting the Calculation Wrong:  The Failure of the Legal Rule to Maximize
1. Defeating Reasonable Expectations
In a democracy, people should and generally do expect the country’s laws to be 
fair and to make sound intuitive sense.  For small-scale transactions, those whose value 
does not justify paying for sophisticated legal assistance, the participants are likely to rely 
primarily on their intuition as to the content of the governing background rules.  These 
96 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 60, at 11-12, 78, & 431-36.   
97 Id. at 23. 
98 Moreover, if Kaplow and Shavell wish to contend that fairness is not simply a mistaken preference, and 
can therefore be taken into account, then they must face the potential consequence that these preferences 
could undermine their current conclusions.  See Mark D. White, Preaching to the Choir:  a Response to 
Kaplow and Shavell’s Fairness Versus Welfare, 16 REV. POLI. ECON. 507, 512 (2004).  The potential for 
these sorts of preferences to undermine seemingly welfare-maximizing policy prescriptions is the subject of 
the next section. 
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expectations are reasonable and will be, in the aggregate, heavily relied upon.  Legal 
rules that go against the grain of expectations will be ignored in such transactions, 
rendering even the most interesting and potentially efficient rules useless in instilling 
appropriate incentives.  A large part of any rule’s value lies not in the results it produces 
in litigation but in the shadow it casts on behavior outside of litigation.  These motivating 
effects are severely diluted to the extent they fall below the radar of their targets and run 
counter to intuition.   
Worse, litigation over such small-scale transactions will likely unwind the parties’ 
precautions and produce unjust windfalls.  At the time they enter into their transaction, 
both parties likely think the governing rule is the intuitive rule.  That rule allocates rights 
to the parties in a way they both understand and consider to be fair.  They build the 
transaction around the rule as they think it to be, and price the deal accordingly.  They 
also take whatever steps they think prudent to ensure performance and to insure against 
risk based on their understanding of how the law will allocate each party’s rights and 
duties.  If the parties later have a dispute arising from the transaction, the court will 
declare victory for one party over the other on the basis of the actual legal rule in effect.  
When the legal rule produces a different result from the rule the parties thought applied, 
their preparations are likely to go awry.  Plus, the surprised victor will gain a windfall at 
the expense of the dismayed loser.  The parties agree to the contract price with a common 
understanding that they are allocating certain entitlements to each.  When the court 
reverses the parties’ distribution, it essentially forces the losing party to pay for the 
entitlement twice:  once as part of the contract price and a second time as damages from 
the litigation. 
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Although high-value transactions guided by expensive counsel seem less 
vulnerable to this phenomenon, rules governing obscure or rare aspects of the transaction 
may suffer from a similar dynamic.  Even experienced lawyers are unlikely to be aware 
of rules that cover relatively rare situations.  A lawyer uncertain about the law could 
expend resources in research to discover the truth, but that search will occur only when 
the lawyer is aware of his or her ignorance.  In the more likely situation in which a 
lawyer is unaware that a special exception exists, that exception may be ignored until it is 
too late, again defeating expectations. 
To understand this dynamic more concretely, imagine that a state adopted a law 
reinstating the doctrine of caveat emptor (buyer beware) for a narrow class of contracts 
only, say contracts dealing with the sale of used cars by used car dealers.  Ignoring the 
expectation problems described in this section, such a rule might be efficient.  In such 
sales, both parties can easily be placed on roughly equal footing.  While the seller 
possesses more information about the car’s history, that advantage can easily be 
eliminated by the buyer’s hiring a mechanic to inspect the car or making the sale 
contingent on a complete disclosure of the car’s maintenance records.  In this context, 
then, there may not be any great need to overcome legal economists’ usual presumption, 
illustrated by all three of our introductory examples, that freedom of contract should 
triumph over any regulatory impulses to protect one side or the other in a transaction.  
Our claim is not that such a rule would actually be efficient – we can certainly see some 
arguments that alternative rules might be better, such as the advantages of imposing 
liability on the party with more information ex ante – but only that there are sufficiently 
strong arguments in its favor that it is reasonable to suppose it might be efficient. 
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Once we consider the rule’s effects on settled expectations, however, the rule’s 
efficiency becomes much more doubtful.  In the last few generations, American 
consumers have increasingly come to expect a certain level of fairness protection in their 
transactions, especially in their transactions with relatively sophisticated counterparties.  
In fact, this caveat emptor proposal would represent a significant change in the existing 
law of most states.  The sale of a car is regulated by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, since cars are movable goods.99  Article 2 applies certain implied warranties in the 
absence of express disclaimers.100  One of these is the Implied Warranty of 
Merchantability, which provides that, unless excluded, a warranty is implied in the sale of 
goods by a merchant (such as a used car dealer) that the goods will be “merchantable,” 
meaning essentially that they are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are 
used.101  Many states provide even more protection in the form of “lemon laws,” which 
provide enhanced remedies when dealers sell consumers cars that are in particularly poor 
shape and cannot be adequately repaired.102  The proposed caveat emptor rule, by 
contrast, would not imply any warranties at all.  Instead, the background default rule 
would provide that buyers of used cars took them on a strictly “as-is” basis, even if they 
turned out not to run. 
 The caveat emptor rule, then, would represent a sharp diversion from consumers’ 
current expectations.  Consumers buying used cars from dealers expect a certain level of 
99 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-102 (Article 2 applies to contracts for the sale of goods) and §2-105 
(goods are all things that are movable, with certain exceptions not relevant here). 
100 See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-314 (Merchantability) and 2-315 (Fitness for a Particular 
Purpose). 
101 Uniform Commercial Code §2-314. 
102 See, e.g., 8 Ala. Code § 8-20A-2 (dealer must refund purchase price and pay any damages for car that 
cannot be brought into conformity with express warranties); Cal. Civil Code §§ 1793.22 - 1793.25 (same); 
Fl. St. Ann. §§ 681.10-681.118 (same); NY Gen. Bus. Law § 198-a (same).  For a more complete list, see 
http://www.carlemon.com/lemonstat.html (last checked January 4, 2008). 
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basic protection.  While at one time this may not have been true – witness the still 
lingering reputation of used car dealers as untrustworthy – we suspect Article 2 and the 
passage of lemon laws in many states have largely changed consumers’ expectations.  
Consumers now are much less likely to take precautions when buying a used car from a 
dealer, such as having the car inspected by a mechanic or insisting on a written warranty.  
Should the law change to a regime of caveat emptor, these consumers would go 
unprotected and often end up with a “lemon” without recourse against the dealer.  Over 
time, consumer groups might manage to educate the public about the new need to take 
greater care, but until then (and for many consumers, even after then), consumers as a 
group would likely suffer a substantial loss from the adoption of the new rule.  This loss 
detracts greatly from the proposal’s efficiency, perhaps enough to outweigh whatever 
gains might be made from the increased freedom of contract.  At a minimum, legal 
economists have paid insufficient attention to the effect on settled expectations, an 
important factor in measuring a proposal’s efficiency. 
2. Instigating Resistance
While the last section discussed a fairly technical problem that is often overlooked 
by economists, in this section we focus on an issue further afield from the rational actor 
model legal economists favor.  Legal economists tend to think of people’s attitudes 
towards rules as reflective of their underlying pecuniary interests.  Corporations care 
about maximizing their profits; individuals care about maximizing their income.  Both 
corporations and individuals will support policies that enhance their financial prospects 
and oppose those policies that will likely cause them economic harm.  But actual human 
beings often care most about concerns that are entirely non-pecuniary and will sometimes 
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willingly suffer financial losses in order to further other interests.  Although it would be 
trite to state this in any non-economic context, human beings often care deeply about 
justice, equality, freedom, fairness, and religion, to name but a few of humanity’s core 
non-pecuniary concerns. 
Non-pecuniary interests are often the most powerful motivators of human 
behavior, and social engineers such as legal economists ignore them at their peril.  In 
particular, individuals who find a particular law offensive may actively attempt to 
circumvent it and undermine its enforcement even when such opposition is costly.  This 
behavior may impair the efficiency benefits that would come from broad compliance. 
As an example of this problem, let us imagine that Congress adopted Richard 
Epstein’s proposal to eliminate the antidiscrimination statutes.  Epstein argued that 
permitting discrimination would be efficient mostly because it would permit companies 
to reduce agency costs.103  He posited that some companies would choose to hire 
primarily members of a particular race as a way to unify workers’ tastes and make the 
business easier to govern.104  Other companies that did not discriminate would also 
benefit from this rule, because the discriminating companies would siphon off most of the 
bigots, who presumably are difficult to manage in racially diverse companies.105 
But what would actually happen to a company that adopted an expressly 
discriminatory hiring policy?  Anti-discrimination norms have taken deep roots in the 
past two generations.  Under these conditions, who would do business with a company 
that blatantly discriminated in hiring?  Even a company that adopted its discrimination 
policy quietly would risk exposure every time an applicant of a disfavored race was 
103 See supra section I.B. 
104 See id. 
105 See id. 
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rejected despite excellent qualifications.  In fact, it would be difficult for a company to 
reap the benefits Epstein identified without making some public statement of its policy, 
so that members of the privileged race would know to apply in greater numbers (not to 
mention the bigots).  Once a company’s discrimination policy was revealed to the public, 
it would no doubt face immediate public condemnation and boycotts organized by groups 
representing the excluded races.  Indeed, the boycotts would likely be joined by groups 
representing every race and religious group, since no race (and no representative group) 
would want to be seen as condoning racial discrimination.  It is difficult to imagine that 
any company that stuck to an express discriminatory hiring policy could long survive, 
regardless of the policy’s legality.  The apparent efficiencies Epstein argued could be 
gained by eliminating the legal restrictions on racial discrimination evaporate once we 
take into account people’s likely resistance to laws they strongly oppose.106 
Epstein’s proposal represents perhaps an extreme, in that nearly everyone at least 
publicly expresses opposition to racial discrimination.  Other proposals might be less 
universally condemned and therefore receive less effusive opposition.  But our point 
holds true for any policy that a sizable group passionately disapproves on principled 
grounds.  A sufficiently outraged opposition will take steps to undermine the law it 
disputes, even when such opposition’s expense far outweighs any anticipated material 
benefits from a policy change.  The resulting costs should be taken into account when 
determining if a proposed law is truly wealth maximizing. 
106 Epstein might contend that our analysis proves his point, that laws forbidding racial discrimination are 
unnecessary, since the same result – nondiscriminatory hiring – can be achieved without them.  But this is 
not how he justified his argument in Forbidden Grounds.  Instead, there he relied on the efficiencies that 
would result from permitting discrimination.  More importantly, our purpose is not to argue the merits of 
any particular policy proposal but to demonstrate that legal economists frequently overlook the important 
consequences that result from individuals’ strong opposition to some legal rules. 
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B. The Hidden Externalities of Unfair Rules:  Undermining Moral Norms and
Legitimacy 
1. Why Citizens Obey the Law
Why do people obey the law?  This question poses a difficult puzzle, especially 
for economists.  For example, there are many goods and services we would very much 
enjoy consuming but which, as academics, we cannot easily afford.  Why do we refrain 
from simply taking them?  Why, in short, do we obey the law prohibiting us from 
stealing? 
Economists’ answer focuses on deterrence.  The law induces obedience by 
establishing appropriate incentives.  We obey the law because the law ensures that it is in 
our interests to do so.107  The law can set up these incentives either by promising rewards 
for compliance or by threatening punishment for disobedience.   
The law’s success in coaxing obedience depends on the credibility of the 
threatened punishment which in turn hinges on both the likelihood of detection and the 
magnitude of punishment.108  If we believe we are almost certain to be caught and 
punished, we are much less likely to steal than if we believe we are likely to escape with 
the stolen goods.  Deterrence is costly.  To make the threat of punishment credible, a 
government must invest heavily in police, courts, and prisons, both to increase the 
perceived risk of capture and to actually imprison those who are caught and convicted.  
For this reason, economists’ vision of the law’s goal is not necessarily to achieve perfect 
deterrence – and therefore perfect obedience – but rather to find the point at which the 
107 See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:  An Economic Approach, 76 J. POLI. ECO. 169 
(1968) 
108 Id. at 176.   
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next dollar spent on deterring crime yields less than one dollar’s worth of crime 
prevention.109  The goal, in other words, is an efficient level of crime. 
Though the workings of deterrence are fine in theory, in practice, an efficient 
level of crime is elusive.  As Paul Robinson and John Darley have documented, there is 
little reason to believe that criminal law deters (at least through this mathematical 
formula).110  Between the low chance of being caught, convicted, and sentenced to 
prison, the prison sentence itself is unlikely to have a strong deterrent effect. 
Indeed, while economists believe that citizens obey the law because they are 
threatened into obedience, other scholars who have studied this question take a broader 
view of the possible causes of obedience.111   Sociologists, social psychologists, and 
political scientists argue that important factors in addition to deterrence include peer 
attitudes towards crime, internal moral norms, and the legitimacy of the government 
institutions that create, administer, and enforce the law.112  Deterrence and peer attitudes 
are both externally imposed methods of achieving obedience, while internal moral norms 
and legitimacy are internally motivated sources of compliance.113  These four sources of 
obedience are interrelated, so that a change in one may have a greater or lesser impact 
through resulting changes in the others. 
109 See id. at 170; see also Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of Criminal Law, 1 
REV. L. & ECON. 175 (2005)(reconciling Becker’s optimal level of crime approach with Posner’s full 
deterrence approach). 
110 See Paul H. Robinson & John Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?  A Behavioural Science Investigation, 
24 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD.173 (2004). 
111 See TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 15 (1990). 
112 See generally id.; Mark D. White, A Social Economics of Crime Control (Based on Kantian Ethics) in 
LAW & ECONOMICS:  ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES
(Margaret Oppenheimer & Nicholas Mercuro, eds. 2005); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility 
of Desert, 91 NW. L. REV. 453 (1997). 
113 See TYLER, supra note 111, at 23-26. 
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In some cases, deterrence is a factor.  Material incentives are an important 
determinant of human behavior.  Not surprisingly, since this is the element economists 
favor, incentives are the factor least likely to be directly affected by the choice of 
counterintuitive or apparently unfair rules.  As long as the incentives are clear and well-
known, they should tend to make the desired behavior more likely (and the undesired 
behavior less likely).  But the results frequently will be less straightforward than 
economists predict, depending on the remaining three factors. 
Peer attitudes towards compliance with the law, in contrast, may tend to 
undermine obedience of rules that are surprising or seem unfair.  Tom Tyler’s seminal 
Chicago study of legal adherence demonstrated that people distinguish among different 
laws when asked whether their peers would disapprove if they were arrested for 
committing one of a series of crimes.114  While only about half of respondents felt that 
their peers would disapprove if they were arrested for making too much noise, littering, 
speeding, or parking illegally, the vast majority of respondents predicted their peers 
would disapprove if they were arrested for drunk driving (86%) or shoplifting (89%).115  
Tyler’s study demonstrated that anticipated peer attitudes vary with the seriousness or 
moral blameworthiness of the crime.  Crimes that appear less blameworthy, either 
because they cause less harm or do not violate a core moral precept, garner less peer 
censure than those likely to cause great harm (such as drunk driving) or which do violate 
fundamental moral principles (such as the prohibition against theft).  Laws that outlaw 
conduct that appears harmless or innocent are unlikely to provoke much peer criticism 
when they are violated.  These rules are consequently less likely to be obeyed.  
114 See id. at 44. 
115 See id. 
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Economists who focus solely on material incentives in predicting compliance will 
therefore greatly overstate the likelihood of observance of counterintuitive or seemingly 
unfair rules. 
Like peer attitudes, internal moral norms are less likely to lead to enforcement of 
odd or immoral laws.  Tyler’s Chicago study demonstrated that most people feel that 
breaking the law is morally wrong, and that this is one of the major reasons why people 
tend to obey the law.116  To the extent people do not feel a particular law parallels their 
personal morality, then, internal moral norms are far less likely to induce compliance.117  
This effect should prove particularly powerful when people believe a law opposes their 
morality.  We see a dramatic example of this effect in abortion foes who bomb clinics.  
Although they know that destruction of property is illegal, they proceed because they 
believe their actions serve a higher moral purpose, that of preventing what they perceive 
to be legally sanctioned murder.  They choose to violate laws they presumably agree with 
(those banning destruction of others’ property) in order to prevent enforcement of a law 
they virulently oppose (that legalizing abortion).  While this is an extreme example, it 
does illustrate the guiding principle:  people are less likely to obey a law that is not 
reinforced by their internal moral norms. 
The fourth and final source of obedience comes from a law’s legitimacy.  
“Legitimacy” refers to the perceived obligation to obey.118  Citizens may feel an 
obligation to obey a law or a legal authority (such as a leader, judge, or police officer) 
116 See id. at 56.   
117 The Chicago Study also found that the vast majority of respondents said that people 
should obey a law even if goes against what they think is right.   Id. at 46.  This finding, 
however, must be read in conjunction with the studies that demonstrate that this measure of 
legitimacy declines among people who disagree with the government’s substantive policy 
choices.  See infra note 120. 
118 See TYLER, supra note 111, at 27-28; MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 124-26 (A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, trans., 1947).   
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when that law or authority stems from a process or institution that they feel creates an 
adequate justification for obedience.119  For example, Americans who believe in 
representational democracy may feel that a statute passed by both the House and the 
Senate and signed by the President should be obeyed even if they disagree with the 
statute’s substance.  The institutions that promulgated the law are rooted in a principle – 
representational democracy – that most Americans feel rightly demands their obedience.  
As a result, those institutions have a great deal of legitimacy in American political culture 
and can often induce compliance even from those who dissent from particular policy 
decisions. 
Legitimacy is a variable sociological characteristic, however, not a physical 
constant.    The legitimacy of sources of law and those who enforce it may decline if the 
laws seem wrong or bizarre.  As a result, people may stop obeying even laws that do not 
seem strange because the overall legitimacy of the system is undermined.  Sociological 
studies support this notion that those who oppose the decisions of legal institutions also 
feel those institutions are less legitimate.120  Legitimacy thus provides some maneuvering 
room for governmental agents to advance policies that may not be popular, but legitimacy 
is ultimately linked to a government’s ability to fulfill its people’s desires.121  A 
government that advances laws that appear immoral or strange may find its legitimacy 
undermined.  Legal economists should consider these risks when arguing for such 
proposals, because the harmful effects on the government’s legitimacy may far outweigh 
119 See TYLER, supra note 111, at 28. 
120 See id. at 30; see also Anke Grosskopf & Jeffery J. Mondak, Do Attitudes toward Specific Supreme 
Court Decisions Matter? The Impact of Webster and Texas v. Johnson on Public Confidence in the 
Supreme Court, 51 POLI. RES. Q. 633, 647 (1998); Valerie J. Hoekstra, The Supreme Court and Local 
Public Opinion, 94 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 89, 96-98 (2000); Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public 
Opinion and the United States Supreme Court:  Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of 
Regime Change, 2 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 357, 374-77 (1968).  
121 See TYLER, supra note 111, at 30. 
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any marginal efficiency gained by adopting counterintuitive rules.  Counterintuitive 
and/or unfair rules may sometimes prove wealth-maximizing.  But that calculation is far 
more complex than most legal economists have heretofore acknowledged.  Such rules 
may have nuanced effects on social wealth through their effect on expectations, their 
conflict with non-pecuniary interests, and their deleterious impact on citizens’ tendency 
to obey the law.   
Applying these findings of Tyler’s and others, Paul Robinson and John Darley 
contend that the criminal law is best served by conforming to citizens’ perceptions of just 
desert.122  As they argue, criminal law serves an essential function in both shaping and 
enforcing moral norms.123  When citizens perceive a rule to be unfair, this may 
undermine the criminal law’s legitimacy and the willingness of citizens to defer to the 
law in unclear cases.124  As Robinson and Darley forcefully argue, legal economists’ 
prescriptions to deviate from desert are far from costless, but rather, may significantly 
undermine crime control.125 
2. The “Flouting Thesis”
Very little has been done to test the empirical assumption that unfair rules will 
undermine overall faith in the justice system.  Still, it seems that any theorist who argues 
that his counterintuitive rule is efficient is implicitly (albeit unwittingly)  making the 
claim that, even taking into account the extent to which this rule undermines citizen 
respect for the law, it is still the best rule.  And, because the legal economist is making 
122 Robinson & Darley, supra note 112. 
123 Id. at 457. 
124 Id. at 487. 
125 Id. at 478. 
33
such a claim, the burden lies on the economist to address and to refute any arguments that 
this rule will be more detrimental than beneficial. 
Moreover, preliminary research does confirm that the legal economist must take 
these concerns seriously.  One theorist who has attempted to understand the extent to 
which an unfair rule will undermine overall faith in the system is Janice Nadler.126  
Nadler recently examined the assumed but unproven “Flouting Thesis.”  “When a person 
evaluates particular legal rules, decisions or practices as unjust, the diminished respect for 
the legal system that follows can destabilize otherwise law-abiding behavior.”127  
In one experiment, subjects were exposed to many newspaper stories including a 
series of stories that portrayed laws as just or unjust.128  Then, for an ostensibly unrelated 
purpose, the subjects were asked to participate in a filling out a questionnaire on their 
likelihood of criminal behavior.129  The questionnaire listed “borderline” crimes such as 
drinking underage, taking home office supplies for personal use, and making illegal 
photocopies of software.130  As predicted, those subjects exposed to stories discussing 
unjust laws indicated a greater willingness to break the law than those exposed to news 
stories about just laws.131   
Nadler also conducted two experiments involving mock trials.  In the first 
experiment, undergraduate students served as subjects.132  They watched a news story 
that depicted either a just or an unjust outcome.133  They were then asked to participate in 
126 Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (2005). 
127 Id. at 1401. 
128 Id. at 1411-1412 
129 Id. at 1413-1414. 
130 Id. at 1414. 
131 Id. at 1415. 
132 Id. at 1417. 
133 Id.  
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a (supposedly unrelated) mock trial.134  In this mock trial, the defendant stole a shopping 
cart and was clearly guilty; however, subjects also knew that because this was his third 
felony, the defendant would receive a life sentence with no possibility of parole.135  In 
this study, the Flouting Thesis was not confirmed.  There was no statistically significant 
correlation between the just or unjust prime and the decision to nullify.136   
Nadler then conducted the study with different participants.  She sent an email to 
over a thousand participants, ultimately yielding subjects 60% female, 82 % white, mean 
age of 37, with 66% from the United States.137  These subjects read the news story (rather 
than watching it on television) and then read a description of the mock trial, and were 
asked their verdicts.138  Under these conditions, the Flouting Thesis was confirmed.139  
There is certainly more empirical work to be done.  Nadler’s research confirms, 
however, that the “Flouting Thesis” is not just a matter of theoretical concern.  Unfair 
rules may ultimately undermine the law itself.   
Let us return to the proposals with which we began.  Imagine that laws were 
enacted that allowed for baby selling, discrimination, and insider trading.  We now see 
that these sorts of laws may undermine the law’s overall legitimacy.  If most people 
believe that discrimination is acutely wrongful, then they will view the law as making a 
profound moral mistake in allowing for discrimination.  As mentioned above, it is 
entirely possible that they would then be less willing to defer to the law as a source of 
moral advice when they are unsure of what to do.  Thus, even if these laws are wealth or 
134 Id. at 1418. 
135 Id. at 1418. 
136 Id. at 1420 
137 Id. at 1423. 
138 Id. at 1424. 
139 Id. at 1424-25. 
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welfare maximizing in the individual case, they may ultimately have significant external 
costs that do not render them wealth or welfare maximizing when considering the legal 
system as a whole. 
We also note that there is another possibility:  citizens believe that the law is 
giving them moral advice, and they then come to believe that these wrongful acts are 
acceptable even in situations beyond the legal economists’ calculations.  For instance, 
assume that Carlton and Fischel’s proposal is adopted and insider trading is legalized.  
Once the law becomes understood as endorsing these “unfair” practices, citizens may 
view it as more permissible to engage in activity the social norm (and even the law) 
forbids.  Rather than recognizing that insider trading is a rather narrow exception to the 
norm against cheating, citizens may cease to believe in a norm of fair play.  If individuals 
with inside information may permissibly use this information to their material advantage, 
citizens may decide that there is nothing wrong with failing to reveal a material defect in 
their home or their used car.  And, what is a little bit of income tax evasion if insiders are 
permitted to cheat?  
3. Undermining Rule of Law Values
There is one final way in which the law may lose its power.  The legal rule may 
undermine the social norm, and the fairness belief itself.  That is, even assuming that 
Kaplow and Shavell are correct and fairness rules are but imperfect proxies for complex 
social welfare standards, the economist cannot ignore the value of having rules.140  When 
legal economists urge that we look beyond fairness beliefs to see whether in any 
particular case a rule is maximizing, they are choosing between the value of rules and the 
value of standards.  This trade-off must also be accounted for in their calculations.   
140 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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The rule versus standards debate is perhaps most famously embodied in the 
debate between Oliver Wendell Holmes and Benjamin Cardozo.  To Holmes, the 
“featureless generality” of negligence would ultimately give way to specific per se rules, 
such as “stop, look, and listen.”141  But Cardozo had the last word, holding that such per 
se rules could not take into account all the circumstances so as to adjudicate correctly 
negligence liability in future cases.142  
There are values to having rules as opposed to standards.143  First, rules can solve 
physical coordination problems.  In situations in which there are several different (and 
incompatible ways) to resolve a problem (for example, which side of the street to drive 
on), a rule can offer a solution.144  Rules can also solve social coordination problems.  To 
the extent that the morally right thing to do turns in part of what others are likely to do 
(for instance, a prisoner’s dilemma), rules provide a basis for prediction.145   
But rules have other values as well.  The rule promulgator may have greater moral 
or factual knowledge than a citizen.146  Additionally, rules help avert errors.  When a 
complex decision must be made, actors who must decide under a standard – analyzing a 
multitude of factors – may simply get the calculations wrong.147  And, by having a rule, 
decision-making costs are reduced.148  As Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin have 
explained, “The quality that identifies a rule and distinguishes it from a standard is the 
141 See Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE 
COMMON LAW 111 (1881).   
142 Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 104 (1934). 
143 See generally LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES:  MORALITY, RULES, & THE 
DILEMMAS OF LAW ch. 1 (2001).; FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES  (1991).  For a discussion 
of rules versus standards in the context of drafting criminal statutes, see LARRY ALEXANDER, KIMBERLY 
KESSLER FERZAN, & STEPHEN J. MORSE, A CULPABILITY-BASED THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW ch. 8 
(forthcoming Cambridge University Press 2008). 
144 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 143, at 56; SCHAUER, supra note 143, § 7.7. 
145 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 143, at 57-58. 
146 SCHAUER, supra note 143, at 55. 
147 Id. at 150. 
148 Id. at 137. 
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quality of determinateness. . . .  [A] rule is a posited norm that fulfills the function of 
posited norms, that is, that settles the question of what ought to be done.”149  
Despite the values of rules, the problem is that rules may be overinclusive.150   
This is, of course, Kaplow and Shavell’s complaint.  If the standard is welfare 
maximization, and a fairness rule is but a rough proxy, the rule may sometimes be 
wrong.151  Interestingly, however, rules are effective only because citizens do not 
frequently question whether they should follow a rule in any particular case.152 
For our purposes, what is essential to note is that even if fairness rules only serve 
a proxy function, undermining that function may have devastating effects in cases in 
which we want citizens to follow the rule.  Ultimately, the value of legal rules is 
consequentialist.  We pursue the Good through indirect rules, rather than through direct 
calculations, because we are more likely to achieve the Good indirectly.153  Thus, the 
stability of these sorts of rules is required for us to be able to achieve the Good in the vast 
majority of cases.154  Hence, even if the underlying consequentalist standard (assuming 
this is what underlies the rule, of course) dictates that discrimination, or cheating, or baby 
selling is the appropriate course in one specific set of circumstances, this sort of deviation 
from the norms of fairness and equality may undermine the value of the rules themselves.  
A legal economist cannot afford to ignore such consequences.  
149 ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 143, at 30. 
150 Rules may also be underinclusive.  That is, the reason that justifies prohibiting conduct a may also 
extend to conduct type b, but the rule may apply only to conduct type a.  SCHAUER, supra note , at 32-33. 
151 ALEXANDER AND SHERWIN, supra note 143, at 35; id. at 32. 
152 See generally Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 
1191 (1994). 
153 See Larry Alexander, Pursuing the Good-Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315, 317-319 (arguing that we need 
“indirect consequentalism” because for some practices pursuing the good directly would be self-defeating). 
154 This still creates the paradox of what to do when the rule does not promote the Good in an individual 
case.  See id at 319-321. 
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IV. The Unexamined Market
There is, perhaps, a more interesting market that we should explore:  the market 
for this sort of scholarship.  The Stanford Law Review, the Journal of Legal Studies, and 
Harvard University Press – the publishers of the examples with which we began – are 
extremely prestigious.  To the extent that the publishers seek to publish only the best and 
aim to signal that the work meets such standards of excellence, why is it that there is such 
a reward structure for these sorts of counterintuitive answers? 
In our view, the failure to account for fairness preferences is a fatal flaw in these 
proposals.  By the measure of their own discipline, legal economists are ignoring a 
variable that affects their ultimate conclusions.  It is therefore significantly troubling that 
publishers who should be evaluating these papers are more influenced by the creative and 
countintuitive nature of the proposals than their rigor. 
Of course, because we have argued that one must consider the externalities of 
one’s proposals, we should consider whether the legal academy is better or worse off for 
these contributions.  There are significant worries here.  The value placed on 
counterintuitive thinking may lead young scholars to believe that this is the only sort of 
policy recommendation that should be made – and that unless they, too, come up with 
bizarre and outlandish ideas, they will never advance in the academy.  (We know people 
who think this.) 
Another concern is that these sorts of proposals can bring the academy into 
disrepute.  If the ivory tower is not just a tower, but a tarnished tower, legal academics 
create more distance between themselves and actual policy makers.  How many 
politicians would like to be viewed as aligned with “baby selling” and discriminatory 
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hiring practices?  Casting these proposals in this rhetoric, and taking economics to the 
extreme may not result in better public policy – just politicians with no trust in the legal 
academy. 
On the other hand, there are competing positive benefits.  We might question 
whether rewarding these sort of proposals encourages creativity.  Then, even if these 
proposals are not welfare maximizing, encouraging this sort of thinking may maximize 
welfare. 
This is an empirical question.  But we will give one example.  At a recent 
Association of American Law Schools meeting, Professor Ian Ayres discussed his career 
path.  When asked what “turned him on” professionally, he replied, “intellectual 
perversity.”155  Now, Ayres is the author of one counterintuitive proposal that we would 
likely condemn.  In a 1989 article,156 Ayres and his co-author Robert Gertner famously 
introduced the concept of “penalty defaults.”157  At that time, when faced with an 
incomplete contract, commentators had urged courts to set default rules as what the 
parties would have wanted.158  Ayres and Gertner, however, argued for penalty defaults 
that are set “at what the parties would not want – in order to encourage the parties to 
reveal information to each other and to third parties.”159  “Penalty defaults are designed to 
give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and 
therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision that they prefer.”160 
155 See Ian Ayres, Paul H. Robinson, Carol Sanger, & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Crafting a Scholarly 
Persona.  Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=998015 
156 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:  An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
157 Id. at 91. 
158 Id. at 89. 
159 Id. at 91. 
160 Id. 
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This is exactly the sort of policy that defeats reasonable expectations.  Indeed, the 
entire goal is to defeat such expectations so that parties will negotiate around the penalty 
default.  However, the value of such a rule depends upon knowing that the rule exists.   
Moreover, as mentioned above, this rule may undermine citizens’ belief in the 
legal system as a whole.  Setting a default rule that penalizes a party hardly seems like a 
“fair” default.  Citizens may have a hard time grasping the rationale behind this rule; they 
will only understand that the rule penalizes a party for some ephemeral purpose. 
Despite the fact that we worry about this specific proposal, however, there may be 
value to encouraging this sort of scholarship more generally.  The same person who 
“thought outside of the box” to bring us penalty defaults has also come up with clever 
and unique answers to other problems.  This “practiced creativity” led Ayres to question 
whether car retailers discriminate (he finds they do161) and whether there are 
discriminatory practices in taxicab tipping.162  And, his ability to turn questions inside out 
has led to a rather unique approach to gay rights.  Together with Jennifer Brown, Ayres 
advocates certification marks that employers and businesses can use to designate that 
they do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.163  This mark thus allows 
those citizens who support gay rights to use their market power to enforce equality, rather 
than trying to use the law to sanction it. 164 So, having rewarded Ayres’ creative thinking 
161 Ian Ayres, Fair Driving:  Gender and Racial Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 817 (1991); Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of 
Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109 (1995). 
162 Ian Ayres, Frederick E. Vars, & Nasser Zakariya, To Insure Prejudice:  Racial Disparities in Taxicab 
Tipping, 114 YALE L.J. 1613 (2005). 
163 E.g., IAN AYRES AND JENNIFER GERARDA BROWN, STRAIGHTFORWARD:  HOW TO MOBILIZE 
HETEROSEXUAL SUPPORT FOR GAY RIGHTS (2005); Ian Ayres and Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Mark(et)ing 
Nondiscrimination: Privatizing ENDA with a Certification Mark, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1639 (2006)).  
164 Ayres and Brown, supra note 163, at 1642 (“The mark provides another way supporters of gay rights 
can vote with their wallets, rewarding progressive policies and institutions. Just as consumers can travel 
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in an instance in which his proposal was counterproductive, the scholarship market 
rewarded creative thinking that led to productive and innovative answers to other policy 
questions.165 
Ultimately then, any discussion of what sort of scholarship leads to the greatest 
welfare maximization must also take into account the broader picture.  Though we cannot 
resolve this empirical question, we certainly believe that those who seek to advance these 
counterintuitive proposals should be aware of the potential consequences.   
Conclusion 
In this essay, we have sought to urge legal economists to take fairness concerns 
seriously.  There is robust evidence that individuals have a preference for fair rules.  
Without taking these strong preferences into account, a legal economist cannot be sure 
that his proposal is actually welfare-maximizing.  Moreover, even if a proposal is 
discretely maximizing, an unfair rule may do significant damage to the value of the rule 
of law itself.  In the face of this empirical evidence, legal economists, who fail to take 
fairness preference into account, are ignoring a variable essential to their calculations. 
Perhaps the failure to include fairness concerns reflects the legal economists’ fear 
that so doing would be to abdicate their calculators for armchairs.  The economist, who 
seeks empirical data, may find the prospect of navel gazing about fairness to be the 
antithesis of his discipline.  But the legal economist need not fear.  Rather, just as the 
legal economist may wish to empirically discover the best legal rule, he may also 
and spend tourism dollars to support progressive state and local governments, so, too, they can reward 
companies that treat gay employees fairly, by purchasing their products and services.”) 
165 Ayres has even co-authored a book on creative problem solving.  BARRY NALEBUFF & IAN AYRES, WHY 
NOT?:  HOW TO USE EVERYDAY INGENUITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BIG AND SMALL (2003). 
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empirically test the strength of individuals’ tastes for fairness.  Indeed, some studies have 
found that the citizenry’s taste for fairness (or lack thereof) may not coincide with initial 
expectations.166  Of course, fairness theorists may be unwilling to concede that fairness is 
just a taste, but acknowledging that fairness exists will lead to better proposals and more 
productive scholarship. 
166 Kahneman, Knetch, & Thaler, supra note 85, at S295. 
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